How does a defense defend two elite receivers without overcommitting resources?
Don’t let the quarterback trust his vision and speed up his timing when the pressure is on. Welcome to Packers defensive coordinator Jonathan Gannon’s game plan for Dak Prescott, CeeDee Lamb, and George Pickens.
Heading into their matchup with Dallas, Green Bay disguised its coverages on 35% of plays and a third of its blitzes. Against the Cowboys, the disguise rate rose to nearly 40%, but the real game plan was to disguise behind pressure.
Overall, the Packers didn’t increase their Blitz Rate (+3%); they increased the volume of coverage disguises behind them. As stated, the baseline for disguised coverages behind blitzes was ~33%. Against the Cowboys, that number rose to 46%. Dak had to contend with disguises on standard plays, and Gannon added a coverage rotation on almost half his blitzes.
Most coverage disguises in the NFL come from two-high shells that spin into Cover 3. 74% of all disguises in the league function from a split-field shell.
Gannon is doing something completely different and attacking Dak in reverse. On paper, Green Bay still has league-standard disguise tools in their scheme, running open-to-closed disguises on ~26% of their snaps (slightly above league average).
But here is where the Packers are unique.
Through six weeks, no team has used more closed-to-open disguises than the Packers (79 snaps). Most defenses rotate into a Tampa 2 scheme, creating the illusion of Cover 3 or 1 before snapping into Cover 2. Across the league, 54% of closed-to-open rotations end up in Cover 2.
The Packers don’t do that.
Gannon does something rare in the NFL; 44% of his disguised coverages from closed-post looks turn into Quarters or Cover 6. Only the Bills use a similar model, and the Patriots only rotate to Quarters (39%).
Until Dak’s Week 6 matchup with the Packers, he'd seen this specific rotation only four times when passing. The Packers ran the rotation six times against the Cowboys. Dak was 2-for-6 with one interception.
Gannon’s addition of pressure increased the stress on the Cowboys’ veteran quarterback. Instead of trying to beat the Cowboys with coverage and double-bracket Lamb and Pickens, Gannon tried to make Dak doubt his vision.
Normally, Dak averages a Time To Throw (TTT) of 2.79 (14th). When defenses disguise their coverages, that number stays stable at 2.73. Against any coverage rotation, the TTT rose to three seconds.
In Week 6, the Cowboys faced 17 total closed-to-open rotations on passing downs. Those snaps produced both of Dak’s interceptions: one against a split-field rotation and the other against a non-traditional Tampa (NTT), which cratered his passer rating to 20.6.
24 of the Cowboys’ 63 dropbacks faced disguised coverage. Gannon used a mix of Tampa and split-field rotations from a closed-post to limit the Cowboys’ passing attack. Lamb and Pickens both ended with 70+ yards, but neither had a TD or a reception over 21 yards.
Instead of attacking downfield, the veteran quarterback became a “Checkdown Charlie,” or a turnover machine. Against static coverage, the veteran posted an 86 passer rating and a 63% completion percentage.
Below, I break down how Gannon and the Packers confused Dak with pressure and disguised coverage, forcing the veteran quarterback into critical mistakes.
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In the film room for MatchQuarters subscribers:
Nail & Sand Pressures: How Green Bay overloaded the B-gap to compromise Dallas’s pass protection and isolate the RB.
Closed-to-Open Quarters: The post-snap poach rules behind Evan Williams’ Red Zone interception.
Boundary “Fist” Tag: The “split-field” mechanics in Tampa that eliminated downfield explosives.
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