Run-and-Hit: How Al Golden Burned the Playbook to Save the Bengals Defense
From passive simulated pressures to downhill aggression—how Cincy traded complexity for production after a mid-season hard reset.
Outside of the Dallas Cowboys, there probably wasn’t a worse overall defense in the NFL than the Bengals. The Jets could at least hang their hat on an average run defense. For Cincinnati, there was no defining quality; it was all bad.
Dig deeper, though, and there were massive improvements under Al Golden in the back half of the season. During Weeks 1-9, the Bengals had the worst defense in DVOA and an open receiver rate of 50% (FTN). Yes, you read that right, half the snaps had a wide-open receiver. The unit looked confused, passive, and completely lost.
Golden was brought back to the Bengals because he has a reputation as a coach who can develop young talent, especially in the secondary. At Notre Dame, Golden developed an elite defense en route to a National Championship appearance. His defense in South Bend was man-dominant and multiple.
Aside from veteran Geno Stone, the Cincinnati secondary was entirely drafted within the last four years, and none had fully blossomed into a consistent starter under former DC Lou Anarumo (Colts), who implemented a “complex” system of coverage checks and pressures.
At linebacker, the Bengals eventually highlighted two rookies, Demetrius Knight Jr. (2nd Round) and Barrett Carter (4th Round). The veteran coach was going to have his work cut out for him, compounded by star DE Trey Hendrickson’s initial contract situation and mid-season injury.
At the league’s midpoint, Golden had the Bengals playing passively. They held the lowest overall Blitz Rate (~21%) and were even more stagnant on early downs (~17%). At one point early in the year, the Bengals had a 4% Blitz Rate! Golden’s initial “attack-react” style of play was not working.
When they did pressure, it tended to be simulated pressures with single-high coverage (62%). Heading into Week 10, the Bengals had the fourth-highest Yards Per Dropback (YBD) versus the blitz in the NFL (7.9) and had the second-worst closed-post EPA in football.
The Week 9 47-42 shootout loss with the Bears was rock-bottom. The two prior weeks had seen the defense give up 31 points to the Steelers (W) and 39 points to the lowly Jets in a home loss. Cincinnati could not stop anything, run or pass.
Luckily for the Bengals, they had a bye at the midpoint of the year. The defense that emerged from that “off” week was completely different. Golden traded complex mental diagnostics for simpler raw aggression. It wasn’t just an improvement; it was a complete philosophical identity shift.
The Hard Reset
Cincinnati’s defensive schedule is a literal tale of two seasons. During the Week 10 bye, the Bengals also traded Logan Wilson to the Cowboys, opening the door for Barrett Carter to be a full-time starter and Oren Burks to become the third linebacker. With Wilson gone, Golden had no choice but to evolve; he traded static looks and passive pressures that required diagnosis for simple aggression.
The new philosophy was anchored by a pivot to more base looks, which saw the Bengals’ “Base” 4-3 personnel average increase from 22% in Week 9 to ~30% in the last nine weeks. That is a ~8% jump!
Up front, the defense was still giving up yards, but it had cut the opposing offense’s efficiency. A large part of the shift to more Base was Burks, who became a “run specialist” of sorts for the Bengals. His run-pass ratio (1.35) ranked 13th out of 99 qualifying LBs. The increased use of Base allowed the linebackers to play more downhill.
Post Week 10, the Bengals finished the year with the third-best Rush Success Rate (36%) and saw their open receiver rate fall to ~33% (10th), improving their YPD by a whole yard!
The simplification did not stop at the front; it extended to the secondary. In the back half of the season, the Bengals' single-high usage jumped to ~68% (1st), and their man coverage spiked to ~43% (1st).
Golden still employed a two-high structure, as reflected in the data: both Jordan Battle and Stone ranked in the top 20 in Man Coverage rates. Similar to other teams that use a high volume of Base personnel, the Safety room was forced to cover more TEs and RBs to free the LBs to fit the box.
Early in 2025, the Bengals experimented with a “fluid” secondary, which created significant communication “gray areas.” The secondary was tasked with being ameba-like, and everyone had to know all the coverage checks and responsibilities in the back seven. Up front, the young linebackers had to read and diagnose, and were typically sitting ducks. Golden had created the same issues as his predecessor; the mental load was too high.
Mid-season, Golden scrapped the fluidity and locked players into specific technical roles. Dax Hill, in particular, was moved back to a “pure perimeter” boundary corner role where he was most comfortable. Jalen Davis was inserted as the full-time Nickel. The Bengals’ secondary was “set,” with clearly defined roles for each player.
Early in the season, Golden sought to determine what worked with the players he had and primarily employed an extremely passive defensive style, given a roster that couldn’t sustain the “sit-and-get” approach or handle the constant rotation of positions.
The idea of a “positionless” defense sounds great on paper, but making it work with certain personnel is easier said than done. The bye-week shift completely transformed the Bengals’ defense and laid the foundation for success.
The Centerpiece
One of the players who prospered from a more simplified approach was South Carolina linebacker Demetrius Knight Jr., who was drafted in the 2nd Round to replace Germain Pratt in the lineup. In fact, the NFL’s Lance Zierlein made him his “comp.” Knight is an athletic linebacker who possesses high-caliber pass-rushing ability but lacks punch at the point of attack against the run.
Early in the season, Golden had Knight playing as a traditional off-ball LB who needed to diagnose and fit. His average depth of tackle was a staggering 6.5 yards, ranking him almost dead last for eligible LBs. He was basically “catching” runners at the second level.
When aligned as an Edge, the staff dropped him on 60% of his snaps and played extensively in the “Slot” in their Base looks (above). Knight was struggling in space, and the staff was using him more as a coverage-first linebacker instead of a hybrid Edge that fit his skill set.
After the bye, that flipped; the staff simplified his mission: Attack!
From Week 10-18, Knight played zero snaps in the Slot and saw his Edge drop rate go below 15%. He became a blitzer, a pass rusher, and an edge setter. By removing the decision-making and space, the Bengals allowed his athleticism and unique rush ability to take over.
Cincinnati’s pivot to five-man fronts and the use of Knight as a de facto Edge simplified the scheme for the players but made it more complex for opponents: less standard looks and passive simulated pressures. Golden simplified the front, tightened the coverages, and turned the team’s biggest liability into a strength.
Let’s dive into the tape!
